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Abstract
We investigate a dynamic model of network marketing in a small-world network
structure artificially constructed similarly to the Watts-Strogatz network model.
Different from the traditional marketing, consumers can also play the role of the
manufacturer’s selling agents in network marketing, which is stimulated by the re-
ferral fee the manufacturer offers. As the wiring probability α is increased from zero
to unity, the network changes from the one-dimensional regular directed network
to the star network where all but one player are connected to one consumer. The
price p of the product and the referral fee r are used as free parameters to maximize
the profit of the manufacturer. It is observed that at α = 0 the maximized profit
is constant independent of the network size N while at α 6= 0, it increases linearly
with N . This is in parallel to the small-world transition. It is also revealed that
while the optimal value of p stays at an almost constant level in a broad range of
α, that of r is sensitive to a change in the network structure. The consumer surplus
is also studied and discussed.
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1 Introduction
The traditional form of the market in economics can be best described by
the set of firms and consumers who sell and buy goods. In a market, a trade
between a consumer and a firm occurs if her valuation v exceeds the product
price p quoted by the firm. This description, however, hypothesizes that the
product is known to consumers in the market, which is not always justified
in real situations. For example, although a company produces a brand new
product which can potentially attract millions of people, the company can
sell very few if the information of this new product has not been propagated
yet across the public. In a modernized society it costs a fortune only to make
the public know that there is a new product, and companies are spending
tremendous amounts of money in massive advertisement on, e.g., a half-minute
TV commercial or a small portion of a nationwide newspaper. Sponsoring
Olympic games or World Cup football championship costs much more.
From the above reasoning, it is natural that some companies seek other ways
to make the product information available without spending the advertise-
ment cost. One of the strategies along this direction is to motivate a buyer to
recommend the product to her social surroundings. An obvious way for this is
to pay the consumer if the referral induces the actual purchase of the product
by her social acquaintances. This is how network marketing works.
In this paper, we introduce a way of constructing a small-world tree network 1
analogous to the Watts-Strogatz network model [1,2] and use a game theo-
retic numerical approach to simulate network marketing in which the product
is sold only through the connections in an existing social network. In parallel to
the geometric small-world transition that the average distance from the man-
ufacturer ceases to increase linearly with the network size, it is observed that
manufacturer’s profit exhibits striking difference between the one-dimensional
regular chain network and the small-world tree network. We also investigate
the consumer surplus in network marketing, in comparison with conventional
marketing.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. 2, the construction method of small-
world tree networks is introduced. The game of consumer referrals is reviewed
in Sec. 3, and extended to the case of general tree networks. Section 4 is de-
voted to the main result for manufacturer’s profit and also includes a discussion
of the consumer surplus. Finally, a brief summary is presented in Sec. 5.
1 In this paper, the term ”small-world network” means a network with a very short
characteristic path length, irrespective of the clustering property. In that sense, the
tree network constructed here is a small-world network with a vanishing clustering
coefficient.
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Fig. 1. Construction of the network of consumer referrals. Starting from the
one-dimensional chain in (a), each edge is visited and then rewired with proba-
bility α. The edge (j, j + 1) with j = 2, 3, and 4 in (a), (b), and (c), respectively, is
rewired to a randomly selected vertex among the vertices whose ranks are less than
the rank of j. Open square is the manufacturer, and circles represent consumers.
At each step, the filled circle represents the vertex whose downward edge is under
consideration of rewiring. The crossed edge denotes the situation when the rewiring
is decided with probability α. The index i of each vertex and its rank R, which
is the distance from the manufacturer, are shown for convenience. See the text for
more details.
2 The Network
Social connections of people in societies have been studied in the framework of
complex network [1]. In most social networks, it is now well-known that they
share characteristics in common such as the small-world behavior, a high level
of clustering, and so on. We here construct a directed small-world network in
the same spirit as the Watts-Strogatz model [2] and then play the game of
consumer referrals [3] on top of the network. To make the situation simple,
we assign each consumer a unique value of the rank which is the distance
(number of edges) from the company, and assume that each consumer has
only one precedent consumer except the first consumer. A consumer at rank
R can refer all consumers at rank R + 1 directly connected to her. However,
the reverse referral is forbidden (the product information flows only in the
downward direction from the company) and accordingly, each consumer gets
the referral only from one unique precedent consumer. In the graph theory,
the above structure is better captured by the directed tree graph. 2
Figure 1 shows schematically the construction method of the network used in
this work. We first build a one-dimensional (1D) directed chain in Fig. 1(a),
where we have five consumers (circles) labelled as i = 1, 2, · · · , 5 and the
2 We restrict ourselves to tree graphs to avoid the situation when a consumer gets
more than one referrals. See Sec. 3.
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company (square). The rank R of the consumer i in the initial 1D chain is
thus given by Ri = i. Starting from the consumer j = 2 [marked by a filled
circle in Fig. 1(a)], we decide whether or not to rewire the edge (j, j+1) with
probability α. If rewiring is decided [marked by the crossed edge in Fig. 1(a)],
all consumers and their connections below j = 2 are attached to a randomly
selected vertex in the set {i|Ri < Rj}. For example, in Fig. 1(a), Rj=2 = 2
and there is only one vertex (i = 1) with Ri < 2, resulting in the network
structure in Fig. 1(b). The process goes on to j = 3 in Fig. 1(b), which shows
the situation as an example that the edge is not selected to be rewired. In
Fig. 1(c) for j = 4, the edge (j, j + 1) can be rewired to either i = 1 or i = 2.
In the case that there are more than one vertex to which the edge can be
rewired, one is randomly picked: Shown in Fig. 1(d) is the situation that i = 2
is selected. The whole process continues subsequently from j = 2 to j = N−1.
When the rewiring probability α = 0, the network reduces simply to a one-
dimensional regular chain network, while in the opposite case of α = 1, the
network becomes a star-like network in which vertices i = 2, 3, · · · , N are all
connected to i = 1. Similarly to the original Watts-Strogatz network [2], one
can change the network structure by varying the rewiring probability α.
In most studies of complex networks, the characteristic path length defined as
the average geodesic length connecting each pair of vertices has been widely
used to characterize the structural property of the network. In particular,
many networks have been shown to exhibit the so-called small-world behavior
that the characteristic path length increases with the network size N very
slowly (often in the logarithmic way). In the present study we define the
average rank 〈R〉 according to
〈R〉 ≡
1
N
∑
i
Ri, (1)
which is simply the number of edges from the manufacturer, analogous to the
characteristic path length in the network literature.
In Fig. 2, 〈R〉 is displayed as a function of α for various sizes N = 100, 200, 400,
and 800. As α is increased from zero, 〈R〉 reduces monotonically, becoming
almost independent of N for sufficiently large values of α. The inset of Fig. 2
shows 〈R〉 as a function of N for α = 0, 0.01, 0.02, and 0.10. It is clearly
observed that the cases α = 0 and α 6= 0 exhibit quite different behavior:
When α = 0, 〈R〉 = (
∑N
i=1 i)/N = (N + 1)/2 ∝ N , while for α 6= 0, 〈R〉
increases very slowly with N . Consequently, the network of consumer referrals
constructed in the present work shows the small-world behavior at α 6= 0,
similarly to the original Watts-Strogatz network [2].
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Fig. 2. The average rank 〈R〉 as a function of the rewiring probability α for networks
of sizes N = 100, 200, 400, and 800. 〈R〉 is observed to decrease with α. decays.
Inset: 〈R〉 versus N for α = 0, 0.01, 0.02 and 0.1. As soon as α takes a nonzero
finite value, 〈R〉 ceases to increase linearly with N , manifesting the small-world
transition at α = 0.
3 The Game of Consumer Referral
In this section, the game of consumer referrals is played on the network con-
structed in Sec. 2. The manufacturer produces the product at the marginal
cost c and sells it at the price p to consumers. To make sense, p should be
larger than c for the company tries to make a positive profit. We assume
that a consumer’s valuation v for the product constitutes quenched random
variables following given distribution function f(v). For simplicity, we use the
uniform probability distribution function: f(v) = 1 for v ∈ [0, 1] and f(v) = 0
otherwise.
The standard market works in a very simple way: The ith consumer has val-
uation vi and decides whether or not to buy according to the condition
vi > p. (2)
If the inequality is satisfied, the product is bought by the consumer since she
thinks that the product is worth her spending. Accordingly, the probability of
the purchase per consumer is simply 1− p (for the uniform distribution of the
valuation), yielding the total profit of the manufacturer Π
Π = N(1− p)(p− c)− A, (3)
where A is the advertisement cost. The optimal price
pmax ≡ (1 + c)/2 (4)
5
yields the maximum profit
Πmax =
N
4
(1− c)2 − A. (5)
In the case of network marketing, the situation becomes more complicated
since each player can also make a profit if her referral induces actual purchase.
In our model, we include both the referral cost δ which is the cost to make
one referral, and the referral fee r which is the initiative money the company
pays in return for a successful referral. Each consumer pays δ irrespective
of the success of her referral (e.g., the consumer has to make phone calls to
persuade her social surroundings to buy the product) while r is paid to her
on the condition of a successful referral. As a simple example, consider the 1D
regular network of two consumers 1 and 2. The second consumer has none to
refer and thus her decision making is quite simple: She buys the product if
v2 > p. On the other hand, the first consumer buys if
v1 > p−max{r(1− p)− δ, 0}, (6)
where 1 − p is the probability that the second consumer buys the product.
When this happens the first consumer earns the money r. Regardless of the
success of her referral she should spend the cost δ. If there is no worth making
referrals, i.e., when r(1 − p) − δ is less than zero, she simply does not make
any referral but she still buys if v1 > p.
3 If there are N consumers in the 1D
regular chain network, the purchase condition (6) for consumer i reads
vi > v¯i (7)
with the minimum valuation
v¯i = p−max{r(1− v¯i+1)− δ, 0}, (8)
where 1− v¯i+1 is the probability that the (i+1)th consumer buys the product.
Generalization of Eq. (8) to the network structure in Sec. 2 is straightforward:
v¯i = p−
∑
j∈Λi
max{r(1− v¯j)− δ, 0}, (9)
where Λi is the set of neighboring consumers of i in the downward direction
from the manufacturer. For the consumers at the bottom ranks the minimum
valuation is given by v¯i = p.
3 In economics, it is usually assumed that the participants in a market have un-
bounded rationality. In the present consumer referral model, we also assume that
each player is smart, having full knowledge of the network structure and understand-
ing game dynamics completely. From the physicist point of view, it is of interest to
generalize the model towards the case of bounded rationality [4].
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The consumer referral game in the present study goes as follows: (i) The
network of size N with the rewiring probability α is built. (ii) The valuation
vi of each consumer is assigned from the uniform distribution in [0, 1]. (iii)
Starting from the consumers at the end of the network whose ranks take
the largest value, we compute the minimum valuations as described above
[v¯i = p for bottom consumers and Eq. (9) for others]. (iv) After the minimum
valuation is computed for every consumer, we consider consumer i at rank
Ri, starting from i = 1, and check the condition vi > v¯i. If the inequality
is fulfilled, the product is bought by i, and we proceed to the consumers at
rank Ri+1. If the inequality is not satisfied and consumer i does not buy the
product, the chain of buyer’s referral on the branch terminates. (v) The game
ends when all chains of buy-and-refer stop. When the game ends, we compute
the profit of the manufacturer
Π = Nbuyer(p− c)− (Nbuyer − 1)r, (10)
where Nbuyer is the number of consumers who bought the product. We fix c
and δ as constants and obtain the profit Π as a function of p and r. From the
point of view of the manufacturer, we aim to optimize the profit with respect
to both p and r.
In our game of consumer referrals, we assume that only the consumers who
actually bought the product make referrals. We believe that this assumption
is reasonable in view of that few people are willing to buy the product if the
referrer herself has not bought it.
4 Results
4.1 Manufacturer’s Profit
Numerical simulations are performed at fixed values of the marginal produc-
tion cost c = 0.05 and the referral cost δ = 0.01 (the use of other values,
if not too different, is not expected to change the main results). In the two-
dimensional parameter space (p, r) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1], we first divide each param-
eter range into ten intervals of the width ∆ = 0.1 and then compute the profit
of manufacturer Π(p, r) at the centers of 100 square boxes in the 2D param-
eter space. For the box where Π has the largest value, we repeat the above
procedure four times with subsequently narrower intervals (∆ = 0.01, 0.001,
and 0.0001). When Π(p, r) is computed for given values of p and r, we make
an average over 10,000 different realizations of the network structure and val-
uation.
Figure 3 displays the maximum profit of the manufacturer per consumer
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Fig. 3. The maximum profit of the manufacturer per consumer Πmax/N versus
the rewiring probability α for networks of sizes N = 100, 200, 400, and 800. Inset:
Πmax/N versus N for α = 0.0, 0.02, and 0.04.
(Πmax/N) as a function of the rewiring probability α. As α is increased from
zero, Πmax is shown to be monotonically increasing. Since all curves for differ-
ent network sizes overlap in a broad range of α except the region where α is
close to either zero or unity, we henceforth focus on the system size N = 800.
One can also conclude from Fig. 3 that the profit is proportional to the net-
work size in the broad intermediate region of α as expected. In the inset of
Fig. 3, Πmax/N is exhibited as a function of N at α = 0.0, 0.02, and 0.04.
Clearly shown is that the behavior at α = 0 is strikingly different from those
at α 6= 0. Specifically, for α = 0 the maximum profit Πmax is constant irrespec-
tive of N while it grows linearly with N for sufficiently large networks as soon
as α takes a nonzero value. This observation is in parallel to the small-world
transition discussed in Sec. 2 (see Fig. 2), implying that the abrupt change in
the behavior of Πmax at α = 0 is closely related with the structural small-world
transition, reflected in the behavior of 〈R〉.
The behavior around α = 1 in Fig. 3 is also interesting: As N grows larger,
the increase of Πmax with α approaching unity appears to be sharper, which
indicates that in the thermodynamic limit (N →∞) Πmax should have discon-
tinuity at α = 1. When α = 1, the network reduces to a star network, where
all but one consumer (i = 2, 3, · · · , N) are connected to the first consumer
(i = 1). It is then straightforward to compute Πmax as follows: The minimum
valuation for the ith (i > 1) consumer simply reads v¯i = p because she has
none to refer, while the first consumer has v¯1 = p−(N−1)max{r(1−p)−δ, 0}.
The case of r(1−p)−δ ≤ 0 is trivial: the first consumer buys the product with
probability 1 − p but she does not make any referral. In the opposite case of
r(1− p)− δ > 0, the minimum valuation for the first consumer becomes neg-
ative for sufficiently large values of N and consequently she always buys the
product, resulting in the total number of buyers Nbuyer = 1+(N−1)(1−p). The
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Fig. 4. The optimal price pmax and the optimal referral fee rmax for the network of
size N = 800.
manufacturer’s profit per consumer is thus given by Π/N = (1− p)(p− c− r)
in the limit of large N , and the optimal value of p is obtained from ∂Π/∂p = 0,
leading to the relation pmax = (1+ c+ rmax)/2. Since the profit is a decreasing
function of r, rmax is attained when rmax satisfies rmax(1− pmax) = δ and one
finally gets rmax ≈ 0.02, pmax ≈ 0.535, and Πmax/N ≈ 0.216 for the values
c = 0.05 and δ = 0.01 used in this work. This approximate value of Πmax/N
is in reasonably good agreement with the value at α = 1 in Fig. 3, appar-
ently supporting the existence of the discontinuity of Πmax/N at α = 1 in the
thermodynamic limit.
In Fig. 4, the optimal values (a) pmax and (b) rmax are shown as functions
of the rewiring probability α for N = 800. The values in Figs. 3 and 4 at
α = 1 are reasonably well described by the above approximate calculations
[accurate only in the leading-order terms of O(1/N)]. It is very interesting to
note that the optimal value of the price pmax does not change significantly with
α in a broad range of α, while the optimal value of the referral fee rmax keeps
decreasing with α. Consequently, the above result suggests that in network
marketing the manufacturer needs to decrease the referral fee as the network
structure becomes more complex from the 1D chain network.
We next compare the above results obtained from network marketing with the
results for the conventional market. The maximum profit for the conventional
market in Eq. (5) is larger for the corresponding value for network marketing
shown in Fig. 3 when the advertisement cost A is not so great. However, in case
that A grows large, e.g., for realistic values of N , the manufacturer can make
more profit by changing to network marketing. For example, if the company
spends 50% of its profit as the advertisement cost, the company can make
more profit in network marketing with α = 0.7.
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Fig. 5. The consumer surplus averaged over all consumers obtained at optimized
values of pmax and rmax (see Fig. 4) for N = 800 [see Eq. (11) and the text for
details].
4.2 Consumer Surplus
The monotonically increasing behavior of the maximum profit in Fig. 3 sug-
gests that the manufacturer prefers the situation in which all but one consumer
buy without referrals, and only one consumer makes all referrals and earns a
big profit. This star-like network structure is simply equivalent to the situation
when the manufacturer makes a daughter firm which takes care of all issues
related with the distribution and the sale of the product.
We study the consumer surplus as follows: For given network structure param-
eterized by α, the manufacturer maximizes its profit as described in Sec. 4.1
by using the optimal values pmax and rmax. At given values of pmax and rmax,
the surplus for the ith consumer reads
pii = rmaxni − δki + (vi − pmax), (11)
where ki is the number of consumers (or potential buyers) attached to i , ni
is the number of actual buyers among ki consumers, and vi− p is the measure
of i’s satisfaction in buying the product (the larger vi−p, the happier). When
the consumer i does not buy the product her consumer surplus pi = 0 since
she gets no referral fee from the manufacturer and does not spend any referral
cost.
Figure 5 displays the averaged consumer surplus 〈pi〉 ≡ (1/N)
∑
pii. Very in-
terestingly, the consumer surplus increases first, then stays almost at the same
level around 0.16, and finally decreases again as α = 1 is approached. It is
thus concluded that while manufacturer’s profit becomes the highest at α = 1,
this does not lead to the highest consumer surplus.
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In the conventional market described by Eqs. (4) and (5), the surplus v− p is
realized only when the consumer buys, i.e., when the inequality (2) is satisfied,
and accordingly the surplus per consumer is given by
〈pi〉 =
∫ 1
0
max(v − p, 0)f(v)dv =
∫ 1
p
(v − p)dv, (12)
where the uniform distribution f(v) = 1 for v ∈ [0, 1] has been used. Inserting
Eq. (4) to Eq. (12), one obtains
〈pi〉 ≈ 0.11, (13)
where the same value of c = 0.05 has been used as in network marketing. It
is interesting to see that although conventional marketing outperforms net-
work marketing from the viewpoint of the manufacturer’s profit (unless the
advertisement cost is large), the consumer surplus is much larger for network
marketing in a broad range of α.
5 Summary
We have proposed a game theoretic way to study network marketing where
consumers can also play the role of selling agents motivated by the referral fee
the company offers in return for successful referrals. A simple model to build
directed tree networks has been introduced to investigate the effects of the net-
work structure on the game of network marketing. As the rewiring probability
α is increased from zero to unity, the network structure changes from a one-
dimensional regular chain to a star network. The manufacturer’s profit is then
numerically maximized by using the two parameters in the game: the price of
the product and the referral fee. Observed is that the manufacturer’s profit
takes the maximum value at α = 1 (the star network) as expected. We have
also investigated the consumer surplus and found it higher at intermediate
values of α. Although the manufacturer’s profit is higher in conventional mar-
keting than in network marketing in general, the consumer surplus has been
found to be opposite, i.e., higher in network marketing. In real situations, the
higher consumer surplus in network marketing may motivate each consumer
to broaden her social acquaintances, eventually increasing the total number of
potential buyers. When this happens, the manufacturer can consider changing
to network marketing.
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